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I. INTRODUCTION
A taxpayer who has endured an IRS audit and the administrative
appeals process, without restitution of all tax issues involved, is faced
with the prospect of litigation to resolve the dispute. The decision of
whether to litigate will certainly involve a careful analysis of the tax
issues involved. However, another important factor will be the costs
extracted by the legal system to pursue the fight. The realistic prospect of collecting attorney fees from the government in tax litigation
may be the deciding factor in the decision to pursue the court battle.
For cases filed after February 28, 1983, litigants are bound by the
provisions of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 74301 when at* Associate Professor of Accounting/Law & Taxation. Edwin L. Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex.; J.D., Arizona State University; L.L.M.
Taxation, University of San Diego, San Diego, Ca.; C.P.A.; member of the Arizona and California Bars.
1. See I.R.C. § 7430 (Supp. 1985) (awarding of court costs and certain fees). This section
provides:
§ 7430. Awarding of court costs and certain fees
(a) In general.-In the case of any civic proceeding which is--
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tempting to collect attorney fees from the federal government in tax
(1) brought by or against the United States in connection with the determination,
collection, or refund of any tax, interest, or penalty under this title, and
(2) brought in a court of the United States (including the Tax Court and the United
States Claims Court), the prevailing party may be awarded a judgment for reasonable litigation costs incurred in such proceeding.
(b) Limitations.(1) Maximum dollar amount.-The amount of reasonable litigation costs which
may be awarded under subsection (a) with respect to any prevailing party in any
civil proceeding shall not exceed $25,000.
(2) Requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted.-A judgment for reasonable litigation costs shall not be awarded under subsection (a) unless the
court determines that the prevailing party has exhausted the administrative
remedies available to such party within the Internal Revenue Service.
(3) Only costs allocable to the United States.-An award under subsection (a) shall
be made only for reasonable litigation costs which are allocable to the United
States and not to any other party to the action or proceeding.
(4) Exclusion of declaratory judgment proceedings.(A) In general.-No award for reasonable litigation costs may be made under
subsection (a) with respect to any declaratory judgment proceeding.
(B) Exception for section 501(c)(3) determination revocation proceedings.-Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any proceeding which involves the revocation of a determination that the organization is described in section 501(c)(3).
(c) Definitions.-For purposes of this section(1) Reasonable litigation costs.(A) In general.-The term "reasonable litigation costs" includes(i) reasonable court costs,
(ii) the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses in connection with the civil
proceeding,
(iii) the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project which is found by the court to be necessary for the preparation of the
party's case, and
(iv) reasonable fees paid or incurred for the services of attorneys in connection
with the civil proceeding.
(B) Attorney's fees.-In case of any proceeding in the Tax Court, fees for the
services of an individual (whether or not an attorney) who is authorized to
practice before the Tax Court shall be treated as fees for the services of an
attorney.
(2) Prevailing party.(A) In general.-The term "prevailing party" means any party to any proceeding
described in subsection (a) (other than the United States or any creditor of
the taxpayer involved) which(i) establishes that the position of the United States in the civil proceeding
was unreasonable, and
(ii) (I) has substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in controversy,
or
(II) has substantially prevailed with respect to the most significant issue
or set of issues presented.
(B) Determination as to prevailing party.-Any determination under subparagraph (A) as to whether a party is a prevailing party shall be made-
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litigation cases. This change made by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA)2 took tax litigation out from under
the provisions of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) 3 with regard to the collection of attorney fees from the government.
While tax cases filed prior to March 1, 1983, continue to be covered
by the EAJA, this article will deal solely with the rules existing for
cases fied after February 28, 1983. First, this article will examine the
provisions of section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code. Second,
cases where the taxpayer was actually awarded attorney fees against
the government will be analyzed to provide clues for potentially successful tactics. Finally, in light of the sunset provision contained in
(i)

by the court, or

(ii)

by agreement of the parties.

(3) Civil actions.-The term "civil proceeding" includes a civil action.
(d) Multiple actions.-For purposes of this section, in the case of(1) multiple actions which could have been joined or consolidated, or
(2) a case or cases involving a return or returns of the same taxpayer (including
joint returns of married individuals) which could have been joined in a single
proceeding in the same court, such actions or cases shall be treated as one civil
proceeding regardless of whether such joinder or consolidation actually occurs,
unless the court in which such action is brought determines, in its discretion,
that it would be inappropriate to treat such actions or cases as joined or consolidated for purposes of this section.
(e) Right of appeal.-An order granting or denying an award for reasonable litigation
costs under subsection (a), in whole or in part, shall be incorporated as a part of the

decision or judgment in the case and shall be subject to appeal in the same manner as
the decision or judgment.
(f) Termination.-This section shall not apply to any proceeding commenced after December 31, 1985.
Id. § 7430.
2. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 STAT.
324, 572 (1982) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7430 (Supp. 1985)).
3. See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 STAT. 2325 (1980) (codified in
various United States Code sections including titles 5, 28, and 48). For a discussion on the
requirements and provisions of the Equal Access to Justice Act, see generally Jones, The Equal
Access to Justice Act: When Will It Permit Attorneys' Fees, 56 J. TAX'N 164 (1982); Robertson
& Fowler, Recovering Attorneys' Fees From the Government Under the Equal Access to Justice
Act, 56 TULSA L. REv. 903 (1982); Note, Attorney's Fees in Tax Cases After the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 36 TAx LAW. 123, 134-47 (1982).
4. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 STAT. 324, 572
(1982) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7430 (Supp. 1985)). For a discussion on the historical
development of collecting attorney's fees from the federal government in tax litigation, see
generally Comment, Tax Litigation and Attorney's Fees: Still A Win-Lose Dichotomy, 57 S.
CAL. L. REv. 471 (1984); Note, Attorney's Fees In Tax Cases After the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, 36 TAx LAW. 123 (1982); Note, Award of Attorney Fees in Tax
Litigation, 19 VAL. U. L. REv. 153, 157-80 (1984).
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section 7430,5 the desirability and likelihood of continuing this type of
statute will be discussed.
II.

REQUIREMENTS OF

IRC SECTION 7430

The basic requirements of section 7430 appear fairly simple on first
reading. As with many statutes, however, interpretation of words inherently difficult to define, such as "substantial" and "unreasonable,"
complicate understanding of the statute. Section 7430 authorizes, but
does not mandate, the award of "reasonable litigation costs" to the
"prevailing party" in any civil (not criminal) tax litigation brought in
a federal court. 6 To better understand the situations where the taxpayer has the possibility of collecting attorney fees from the government, each portion of the preceding summary sentence must be
clarified.
The potential remedy of attorney fees is available in all federal7
courts, including the Tax Court and the United States Claims Court.
The opportunity to recover attorney fees in the Tax Court under section 7430 is a significant advantage over EAJA, which was interpreted
to prohibit an award of fees for cases filed in the Tax Court and other
federal courts.' Since the largest number of original jurisdiction tax
cases are tried in the Tax Court, section 7430 significantly broadens
the availability of potential attorney fees.
Section 7430 provides that "reasonable litigation costs" incurred by
5. See I.R.C. § 7430(0. This section provides in the pertinent part: "This section shall
not apply to any proceeding commenced after December 31, 1985." Id. § 7430.
6. See id § 7430(a). This section states in the pertinent part: "[i]n the case of any civil
proceeding... the prevailing party may be awarded a judgment for reasonable litigation costs

incurred in such proceeding." Id. § 7430(a).
7. See id. § 7430(a)(2). This section provides for the awarding of court costs and certain
fees "in the case of any civil proceeding which is... brought in a court of the United States
(including the Tax Court and the United States Claims Court) ... " Id § 7430(a)(2).
8. See, e.g., white v. Comm'r, 537 F. Supp. 679, 689 (D. Colo. 1982) (statute does not

authorize award of attorney fees);' Engles Coin Shop, Inc. v. Comm'r, 52 T.C.M. (P-H)
83,561 (T.C. 1983) (Tax Court without authority to award attorney fees under EAJA); Crock
v. Comm'r, 52 T.C.M. (P-H) 83,351 (T.C. 1983) (Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to award

attorney fees prior to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act); see also Jenny v. Comm'r,
52 T.C.M. (P-H) 83,001 (T.C. 1983) (Tax Court without authority to award attorney fees
under Equal Access to Justice Act). The House Report accompanying the Act states that
cases brought in the United States Tax Court are not within the provisions of the Equal Access
to Justice Act. See H.R. Rep. No. 404, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See generally Note,
Attorney's Fees in Tax Cases After the Tax Equity and FiscalResponsibilityAct of 1982 36 TAx
LAW. 123, 144-47 (1982) (discussion of rationale for excluding United States Tax Court from
provisions of EAJA).
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the prevailing party may be awarded in a tax case brought by or
against the United States. 9 "Reasonable litigation costs" include
court costs, 10 expenses of expert witnesses," costs associated with the
preparation of studies, analyses, engineering reports, tests or
projects, 2 and attorney fees.' 3 Since the Tax Court allows qualified
persons who are not attorneys to represent taxpayers before the court,
fees paid to such persons qualify as attorney fees for possible reimbursement.' 4 The statute further provides that the maximum award
for "reasonable litigation costs" in any proceeding is $25,000;11 however, no specific hourly attorney fee limit is imposed.' 6 Finally, the
definition of "reasonable" costs under the statute is left to the discre-

tion of the court.17
Other statutory limitations also exist which make life difficult for
taxpayers who try to get reimbursed for attorney fees in tax litigation
cases. First, taxpayers are not eligible for an award of litigation costs
unless all available administrative remedies within the Internal Reve9. See I.R.C. § 7430(a) (Supp. 1985).
10. See id.§ 7430(c)(1)(A)(i). This section provides: "'reasonable litigation costs' include ...reasonable court costs." Id. § 7430(c)(1)(A)(i).
11. See id. § 7430(c)(1)(A)(ii). This section reads: "'reasonable litigation costs' includes
*..
the reasonable expense of expert witnesses in connection with the civil proceeding." Id.
§ 7430(c)(1)(A)(ii).
12. See id. § 7430(c)(1)(A)(iii). This section provides: "'reasonable litigation costs' includes.., the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project which
is found by the court to be necessary for the preparation of the party's case." Id.
§ 7430(c)(1)(A)(iii).
13. See id.§ 7430(c)(l)(A)(iv). This section provides: "'reasonable litigation costs' includes... reasonable fees paid or insured for the services of attorneys in connection with the
civil proceedings." Id. § 7430(c)(1)(A)(iv).
14. See id. § 7430(c)(l)(B). The statute states: "in case of any proceeding in the Tax
Court, fees for the services of an individual (whether or not an attorney) who is authorized to
practice before the Tax Court shall be treated as fees for the service of an attorney". Id.
§ 7430(c)(I)(B).
15. Id. § 7430(b)(1). This provision provides that: "reasonable litigation costs... shall
not exceed $25,000." Id. § 7430(b)(1).
16. See id. § 7430 (TEFRA sets no hourly limit); see also Note, Award of Attorney Fees in
Tax Litigation, 19 VAL. U. L. Rlv. 153, 185 (1984) (TEFRA sets no hourly limit on amount
of attorney fees). The EAJA, on the other hand, limited reasonable attorney fees to $75.00 per
hour. See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204(a), 94 STAT. 2325 (1980),
coded at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1983). One writer has stated that current hourly
rates being charged under TEFRA exceed the $75.00 hourly limit set by the EAJA. See Note,
Award of Attorney Fees in Tax Litigation, 19 VAL. U. L. REv. 153, 185 n.210 (1984).
17. See I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. 1985). But see Penner v. United States, 584 F.
Supp. 1582, 1584-85 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (limiting attorney fees under section 7430 to $90.00 per
hour).
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nue Service have first been exhausted." Under treasury regulation
301.7430-1(b), the taxpayer is required to participate in good faith in
a conference with the Appeals Office of the Internal Revenue Service.19 This conference must be requested by the taxpayer prior to the
issuance of the statutory notice of deficiency or the "90-day letter."' 20
In situations where no appeals conference is available, however, the
taxpayer must file a written claim for relief with the Internal Revenue
18. See id. § 7430(b)(2). This section requires that "a judgment for reasonable litigation
costs shall not be awarded ... unless

..the prevailing party has exhausted the administrative

remedies available to such party within the Internal Revenue Code." Id § 7430(b)(2); see also
Comment, Tax Litigation and Attorney's Fees: Still A Win-Lose Dichotomy, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 471, 490 (1984) (all administrative remedies must be exhausted); Note, Attorney's Fees in
Tax Cases after the Tax Equity and FiscalResponsibility Act of 1982, 36 TAx LAW. 123, 14950 (1982) (costs available only after all administrative remedies exhausted). An exception exists, however, when the IRS has indicated that the issue involved will be litigated in all cases.
See H.R. REP. No. 404, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1981) (when IRS litigates particular issue in
every case; negates requirement to exhaust all administrative remedies); see also Comment,
Tax Litigation And Attorney's Fees: Still A Win-Lose Dichotomy, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 471, 490
(1984) (exception when issue is one litigated in all cases).
19. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1(b)(1985).
20. Id. § 301.7430-1(g). The following examples are provided in regulation 301.7430-1
(g) to illustrate the provisions of section 7430:
Example(l). Taxpayer A exchanges property held for investment for similar property
and claims that the gain on the exchange is not recognized under section 1031. The
Internal Revenue Service conducts a field examination and determines that there has not
been a like-kind exchange. No agreement is reached on the matter and a preliminary
notice of proposed deficiency (30-day letter) is sent to A. A does not file a request for an
Appeals Office conference. A pays the amount of the proposed deficiency and fies a claim
for refund. A preliminary notice of proposed disallowance is issued by the Internal Revenue Service. A does not request an Appeals Office conference and instead files a civil
action for refund in a United States District Court. A has not exhausted the administrative remedies available within the Internal Revenue Service.
Example (2). Assume the same facts as in example (1) except that, after receiving the
preliminary notice of proposed deficiency (30-day letter) A files a request for an Appeals
Office conference. No agreement is reached at the conference. A pays the amount of the
proposed deficiency and files a claim for refund. A preliminary notice of proposed disallowance is issued by the Internal Revenue Service. A does not request an Appeals Office
conference and files a civil action for refund in a United States District Court. A has
exhausted the administrative remedies available within the Internal Revenue Service....
Example (12). Taxpayer H receives a preliminary notice of proposed deficiency (30day letter) and neither requests nor participates in an Appeals Office conference. The
Service then issues a statutory notice of deficiency (90-day letter). Upon receiving the
statutory notice, H requests an Appeals Office conference. The Appeals Office informs H
that an Appeals Office conference will not be granted. H fies a petition in the Tax Court
after receiving notice of the denial of a conference. H has not exhausted the administrative remedies available within the Internal Revenue Service because the request for an
Appeals Office conference was made after the issuance of the statutory notice.
Id. § 301.7430-1(g) (examples 1, 2, 12).
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Service.21
Requiring taxpayers to first utilize all administrative remedies limits the discretion of the tax advisor representing the taxpayer. For
example, in some situations the preferable strategy may be to bypass
the appeals conference and proceed directly to litigation. This may
save fees for the client and/or limit the issues to be litigated. By using
this strategy, however, the tax advisor would be relinquishing the opportunity to collect attorney fees from the government for the litigation. The tax advisor's evaluation of whether to request an appeals
conference, therefore, is colored by the possibility of collecting attorney fees from the government in subsequent litigation.
Another limitation contained in section 7430 relates to the subject
matter of the tax litigation. The general rule is that litigation costs
cannot be awarded in declaratory judgment proceedings.22 This provision, therefore, excludes retirement plan qualifications2 3 and determinations of the tax-exempt status of governmental obligations.24 A
specific exception is provided which allows litigation costs to be
awarded in declaratory judgment proceedings involving the revocation of tax-exempt status for a section 501(c)(3) charity or
foundation.25
After avoiding or overcoming all these statutory obstacles, the taxpayer still must qualify as a "prevailing party" in the litigation. 26 To
qualify as a prevailing party, the taxpayer must satisfy a two-pronged
test. First, the taxpayer must have substantially prevailed with regard
to the amount in dispute,27 or substantially prevailed with regard to
the most important issue or sets of issues presented. 28 The standard
21. See id. § 301.7430-1(d)(1)(1985). Situations where no appeals conference is available
include actions involving liens, levies, summonses and termination and jeopardy assessments.
See id. § 301.7430-1(d).
22. See I.R.C. § 7430(b)(4)(A) (Supp. 1985). This section provides that "no award for
reasonable litigation costs may be made... with respect to any declaratory judgment proceeding." Id. § 7430(b)(4)(A).
23. See id. § 7476 (declaratory judgments relating to qualification of certain retirement
plans prohibited).
24. See id. § 7478 (declaratory judgments relating to status of governmental obligations).
25. See id. § 7430(b)(4)(B). This section states that the exclusion of declaratory judgment
proceedings "shall not apply to proceedings which involves the revocation of a determination
that the organization is described in section 501(c)(3)." Id. § 7430(b)(4)(B).
26. See id. § 7430(a). This provision states that "the prevailing party may be awarded a
judgment for reasonable litigation costs. ..." Id. § 7430(a).
27. See id. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
28. See id. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
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of "substantially prevailed" is not set by statute and is subject to varying judicial interpretations. The second prong requires the prevailing
party to establish that the position of the United States was unreasonable.29 Unlike the standard in the EAJA,3 ° the burden of proof is on
the taxpayer to prove that the government's position was unreasonable. 3 ' As discussed below, this unreasonableness requirement is the
major stumbling block for taxpayers attempting to collect attorney
fees from the government in tax litigation. As with the "substantially
prevailed" test, the exact parameters of an "unreasonble" government
position are being defined by judicial decisions.32
29. See id. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 1985). EAJA provides that attorney fees shall
be awarded to a prevailing party unless the United States can prove its position was substantially justified or that special circumstances make the award unjust. See id. § 2412(d)(1)(A);
see also Williamson v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 11, 11 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (government has
burden of showing award should not be made under EAJA).
31. See I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A); see also Randazzo v. United States Dep't of Treas., 581 F.
Supp. 1235, 1237 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (party must establish two conditions before possibility of
being awarded attorney fees). See generally Rubin, Report on TEFRA Provisions With Respect
to Award of Litigation Costs to Taxpayers and Increased Damages to the Government, 62
TAXES 381, 384 (1984) (under section 7430 taxpayer has burden whereas EAJA placed burden
on government); Note, Attorney's Fees in Tax Court After the Tax Equity and FiscalResponsibility Act of 1982, 36 TAx LAW. 123, 155 (1982) (TEFRA shifts burden of proof to taxpayer).
The Senate committee report on TEFRA states: "[t]he committee has explicitly placed the
burden of establishing the unreasonableness of the position of the United States on the taxpayer." S. REP. No. 530, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 687 (1982).
32. See I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 1985). This section provides that the "determination ... as to whether a party is a prevailing party shall be made.., by the court." Id.
§ 7430(c)(2)(B); see also Kaufman v. Egger, 584 F. Supp. 872, 878 (D. Me. 1984) (court determines reasonableness of government's position), affid, 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985); Randazzo v.
United States Dep't of Treas., 581 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (court determines
reasonableness from facts and circumstances surrounding proceeding). See generally Rubin,
Report on TEFRA Provisions With Respect to Award of Litigation Costs to Taxpayers and Increased Damages to the Government, 62 TAXES 381, 384 (1984) (determination of government's reasonableness is made by the court). Specific criteria has been set forth by the House
Ways and Means Committee, however, informing both parties and courts as to facts that indicate unreasonableness on the part of the government. See H.R. REP. No. 404, 97th Cong. 1st
Sess. 12 (1981). The factors include:
(1) whether the government used the costs and expenses of litigation against its position to
extract concessions for the taxpayer that were not justified under the circumstances of the
case; (2) whether the government pursued the litigation against the taxpayer for purposes
of harassment or embarrassment, or out of political motivation; and (3) such other factors
as the court finds relevant.
Id. at 12. See generally Rubin, Report on TEFRA Provisions With Respect to Award of Litigation Costs to Taxpayers and IncreasedDamages to the Government, 62 TAXES 381, 384 (1984)
(listing factors to consider when determining reasonableness); Note, Attorney's Fees in Tax
CasesAfter the Tax Equity and FiscalResponsibilityAct of 1982, 36 TAx LAW. 123, 153 (1982)
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III.

THE WINNERS

While something can presumably be learned by analyzing cases in
which the taxpayer was denied an award of attorney fees, 33 this article's analysis will concentrate on cases in which the taxpayer has been
successful in obtaining an award of attorney fees. Through examining
successful actions brought by taxpayers, the author hopes to illuminate special problems and tactics to ensure similar results for other
taxpayers and their tax counselors.
A.

Circuit Court Decisions

Due to the relatively recent effective date of section 7430, only two
cases in which the taxpayer ultimately prevailed in an award of attorney fees have been decided at the United States Circuit Court of Appeals level. The only reported case is Kaufman v. Egger,34 decided by
the First Circuit. The facts in Kaufman are fairly straightforward
and were not in dispute.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sent an audit notice to the
Kaufmans' address as listed on their 1978 return approximately two
years after the return was filed. 35 The taxpayers had moved to a different state and did not receive the notice. When the IRS did not
receive a response, it mailed a notice of adjustment and the statutory
notice of deficiency to another address where the Kaufmans never
lived. Three years later, the IRS seized the taxpayers' refund from a
more current tax return and informed the Kaufmans of the local Service authority they could contact to make arrangements to pay the
amount due. 36 The Kaufmans, upon learning about this matter, con(discussion of factors courts are to consider when determining reasonableness of governmental
action).
33. See, eg., Jenny v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 1309, 1311 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (award of
litigation costs not authorized), rev'd on other grounds, 755 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1985); Brazil v.
United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9596 (D.Or. 1984) (plaintiffs' motion for attorneys'
fees denied); Eidson v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9182 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (motion for
attonieys' fees denied). For a discussion on unsuccessful attempts to recover attorney fees
under TEFRA, see generally, Note, Award of Attorney Fees in Tax Litigation, 19 VAL. U. L.
REv. 153, 188-90 (1984).
34. 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985).

3.5. See id at 2. The IRS mailed the tax liability notice in October, 1980. The notice,
howev,.r, was sent to an address of another couple also named Kaufman. See id at 2 n.2.
36. See id at 2. The IRS seized the Kaufman's $606 tax refund as a partial payment for
the alleged deficiency. The original assessment was $14,380, however, with the addition of
interest and penalties, the IRS claimed that the Kaufman's owed $23,857. See id. at 2.
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tacted their tax accountant. The accountant contacted the IRS and
was informed that the taxpayers' account had been transferred to the
Taxpayers Delinquent Account Section for collection. The Kaufmans
brought suit in the United States District Court for Maine for injunctive relief and for the return of their seized tax refund. 3 At the end of
this litigation, the district court awarded attorney and expert fees to
the taxpayers, and the IRS agreed to the entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting it from taking any steps to collect taxes due based on
the subject notice of deficiency.38
The IRS appealed the award of attorney and expert fees to the First
Circuit.39 The opening paragraph of the First Circuit's opinion
clearly indicates the court's attitude in affirming the district court's
award:
The present case zeros in on one of many unnecessary tribulations that
can be brought to bear upon the unsuspecting citizenry by today's computerized bureaucracy. It also requires our interpreting one Congressional attempt to grant the public some relief from such bungling.'
Two arguments were advanced by the IRS in its attempt to avoid
an award of attorney fees under section 7430. The first contention
was that the Kaufmans had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies as required in section 7430(b)(2) . 4 The IRS argued that the taxpayers should have tried to resolve the matter internally with the IRS
before filing suit. The court rejected this IRS argument for two reasons. First, since the "draconian collection procedures" of the Taxpayer Delinquency Account Section were threatening the taxpayers,
they should not be faulted for seeking timely judicial relief.12 Second,
37. Kaufman v. Eggar, 584 F. Supp. 872, 872 (D. Me. 1984), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1 (1st (C.r.

1985).
38. See id. at 873.
39. See Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985).
40. Id. at 1-2.
41. See id at 2-3; see also I.R.C. § 7430(b)(2) (Supp. 1985) (prevailing party must exhaust
available administrative remedies). For a discussion on the requirement that all administrative
remedies be exhausted, see generally Comment, Tax Litigation And Attorney's Feew Still A
Win-Lose Dichotomy, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 471, 490 (1984) (all administrative remedies must be
exhausted); Note, Attorney's Fees in Tax Cases After the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982, 36 TAX LAW. 123, 149-50 (1982) (attorney fees available only after all admiuaistrative remedies exhausted).
42. See Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1985); see also I.R.C. §§ 6331-44 (1967
& Supp. 1985) (property seized for collection of taxes); id. § 7403 (action to subject property or
enforce lien for payment of tax).
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the court cited a treasury regulation which excuses the taxpayer's failure to exhaust administrative remedies where the taxpayer, without
fault on his part, does not receive notice of IRS action.4 3
The second argument advanced by the IRS was more substantial.
The position of the IRS was that the language of section
7430(c)(2)(A)" excludes pre-litigation behavior from consideration in
determining whether the government behavior was unreasonable for
purposes of an award of attorney fees. The position excluding prelitigation behavior from consideration has been adopted by several
district courts.45 Other district courts, on the other hand, have permitted consideration of pre-litigation behavior.4 6
The First Circuit in Kaufman adopted the position that pre-litiga-

43. See Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1, 3 (lst Cir. 1985) (citing Treas. Reg. 301.7430-1 (f)
(1985)). Regulation 7430-1(f)(ii)provides in the pertinent part:
A party's administrative remedies within the Internal Revenue Service are considered
exhausted for purposes of section 7430 if... in the case of a civil action for refund... the
party... did not receive a preliminary notice of proposed disallowance prior to issuance
of a statutory notice of disallowance and the failure to receive such notice was not due to
actions of the party (such as the failure to supply requested information or a current
mailing address) ....
Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1-f(3)(ii)(1985). The Kaufman court pointed out that all notices were
either sent to an old address or an address where the taxpayer never lived. See Kaufman v.
Egger, 758 F. 2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1985).
44. See Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1985); see also I.R.C. 7430(c)(2)(A)
(Supp. 1985) (allowing award of attorney fees in cases where "the position of the United States
in the civil proceedings was unreasonable") (emphasis added).
45. See, e.g., Zielinski v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH)
9514 (D. Minn.
1984) (compensation only allowed when government taxes unsupportable position in court
action as opposed to administrative proceeding); Brazil v. United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9596 (D. Or. 1984) (reasonableness of position only considered in litigation, not for
events preceding litigation); Edison v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9182 (N.D.
Ala. 1984) (courts limited to awarding fees based on unreasonableness "in the civil proceeding"); see also Baker v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 822, 827 (1984) (statute requires examination of
reasonableness during litigation as opposed to administrative proceeding); Popham v. Comm'r,
53 T.C.M. (P-H) 84,652 (T.C. 1983) (reasonableness of government's position during litigation can only be considered). See generally Note, Attorney's Fees in Tax Cases After the Tax
Equity and FiscalResponsibility Act of 1982, 36 TAx LAW. 123, 152-54 (1982) (discussion on
reasonableness standard applied to government's position).
46. See, e.g., Penner v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1582, 1583 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (government's initiation of jeopardy assessment considered unreasonable position); Sharpe v. United
States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) $ 13,574 (E.D. Va. 1984) (recovery of attorney's fees allowed
for both administrative and judicial level when government's position unreasonable); Hallam
v. Murphy, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) T 9230 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (proper time frame to consider
government's unreasonableness is throughout entire tax proceeding); see also Kaufman v. Egger, 584 F. Supp. 872, 877-78 (D. Me. 1984) (government's wrongful conduct included prelitigation conduct), a.rfd, 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985).
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tion behavior can be considered in determining whether the government's behavior was unreasonable.47 The court reasoned that this
interpretation was consistent with congressional "remedial bias" in
enacting section 7430.48 The court also cited Senate committee language which stated that awards would be available "when the United
States has acted unreasonably in pursuing the case." 49 By applying
this approach, the court found that the behavior of the IRS was, in
fact, unreasonable. Notwithstanding the finding of unreasonableness,
there was no real discussion of standards to determine "unreasonableness" in the opinion, but the court merely concluded that this particular bureaucratic mixup "was unreasonable by any standard."50 While
the First Circuit's decision failed to enunciate specific guidelines for
determining unreasonable government behavior, it serves as the sole
appellate analysis for future awards of attorney fees under section
7430. Furthermore, the Kaufman decision is important for its broad
47. See Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1985) (government's liability triggered by unreasonable position even if occurring in prelitigation conduct).
48. See id. at 4.
49. Id. at 4; see also Staff of Senate Committee on Finance, Technical Explanation of
Committee Amend., 127 CONG. REC. §§ 15587, 15594 (Dec. 16, 1981). The Kaufman court
pointed out that the intent of Congress in allowing an award of attorney fees is to "deter
abusive actions and overreaching by the Internal Revenue Service and will enable taxpayers to
vindicate their rights regardless of their economic circumstances." Kaufman v. Egger, 758
F.2d 1, 4 (1stCir. 1985) (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-404, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982); Staff of
Senate Committee on Finance, Technical Explanation of Committee Amend., 127 CONG. REC.
§§ 15587, 15594 (Dec. 16, 1981)).
50. See Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1,4 (1st Cir. 1985). In contrast, the lower court did
enunciate several factors in its decision to award attorney fees to the Kaufmans. The district
court found that the government seizure of the Kaufman's tax refund violated the procedures
mandated by the Internal Revenue Code. See Kaufman v. Egger, 584 F. Supp. 872, 879 (D.
Me. 1984), affid, 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985). The district court further stated that the government knowingly violated the law, hoping the taxpayer would pay the additional tax monies
without challenging the improper collection method. See id. at 879. The court concluded that
the government attempted "to use the cost and expense of litigation against its position to
extract concessions from the taxpayer that were not justified under the circumstances of the
case." Id. at 879. A second factor the district court deemed relevant was that the government
could have spared the court and the parties the time and expense of trial. The court stated that
the conduct of the government "smacks of negligence at its best, bad faith at its worse." Id. at
879. A third factor relied on by the district court was the government's seizure of the Kaufman's tax refund. The court concluded that "the seizure amounted to a taking of plaintiff's
property without according them due process of law." Id. at 879. Finally, the district court
stated that a determination that the government's position was "reasonable merely because
they stipulated to entry of judgment against them" would be an unrealistic view of the facts.
See id. at 879. A practitioner, seeking attorney fees from the government would be well advised to preserve an accurate record of the entire pre-litigation relationship with the IRS so
that it can be used in later court actions.
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construction and application of the attorney fees remedy in tax
litigation.
The Ninth Circuit recently issued a memorandum decision upholding an award of attorney fees to a taxpayer for tax litigation, but
stated that its disposition was not appropriate for publication and that
the decision could not be cited to or by the courts of the Ninth Circuit. The case of Haynes v. United States5" involved a divorced taxpayer whose property was the subject of an IRS levy arising from a
pre-divorce joint return tax liability. The taxpayer was not notified by
the IRS as to any potential liability. When Haynes contacted the IRS
after finding out that her assets were subject to tax liens, she was assured that the liens would be released. Since the IRS took no immediate action to release the liens, Haynes filed suit. The IRS still did not
release the liens, claiming that the taxpayer's administrative file could
not be located. Several months elapsed before the IRS finally did release the liens. The district court ultimately awarded attorney fees to
the taxpayer.52
The Ninth Circuit, in undertaking its de novo review of the propriety of the district court's awarding of attorney fees, recognized the
significance of whether IRS pre-litigation behavior could be considered in determining unreasonable government behavior. 53 The Ninth
Circuit, however, did not decide that issue because they found the
unreasonable litigation position taken by the government was sufficient to support the district court's award of attorney fees under section 7430.54 While the Haynes decision does not resolve the prelitigation behavior issue, it does provide a valuable lesson - when
seeking attorney fees from the government, the tax attorney should
use both pre- and post-litigation government behavior to establish
unreasonableness.

51. No. 84-2626, slip op. (9th Cir. July 11, 1985).

52. See id.at 6.
53. See id. at 5.
54. See id. at 5-6. In determining that the government litigation position was unreasonable, the Haynes court noted that: (1) the IRS waited two months before filing an answer to the
taypayer's complaint; (2) in its answer, the IRS denied the taxpayer's allegations due to an
alleged lack of information; (3) the IRS had "ample opportunity to ascertain whether the liens
placed on the taxpayer's property were procedurally defective;" and (4) the IRS opted to
search for its lost administrative file for months rather than simply confirming the taxpayer's
allegations by asking the agent who originally placed the liens. See id. at 6. Also, the court
pointed out that the failure to properly notify the taxpayer of any potential liability violated
both statutory duty and IRS policy. See id. at 2.
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B. District Court Decisions
Several United States District Courts have awarded taxpayers attorney fees against the government under section 7430. In Penner v.
United States," the court abated an IRS jeopardy assessment exceeding $1,300,000 and also released all liens against the taxpayer's property. The basis for the court's actions was its conclusion that the
making of the assessment and the amount demanded were not supported by substantial evidence. 56 In the court's opinion, the IRS had
been neither thorough nor diligent in examining the taxpayer's assets
or other required evidence. 57
In arguing against an award of attorney fees to the taxpayer, the
Internal Revenue Service took the position that its litigation behavior
was reasonable, thereby disqualifying the taxpayer from the definition
of a "prevailing party" under section 7430(c)(2).5 Additionally, the
government argued that its pre-litigation behavior, whether reasonable or not, could not be considered when awarding attorney fees.59
The district court, however, held that the IRS pre-litigation behavior
could be considered because the governmental proceeding was continuous from the initiation of the jeopardy assessment through the deFinally, the court determined that
fense of that assessment.'
Congress would have specifically excluded pre-litigation behavior if
that was its intent.6 1

55. 584 F. Supp. 1582 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
56. See id. at 1583.
57. See id.at 1583.
58. See id. at 1583.
59. See id. at 1583. The government contended that the defending of a civil suit should
be evaluated independently from the government's initiation of the jeopardy assessment. See
id. at 1583. The Penner court, however, stated that no rational basis could be recognized
distinguishing between the initiating of the jeopardy assessment and the defending of that assessment. See id. at 1583. The court concluded that "if the government's position in initiating
the jeopardy assessment was found to be unreasonable, . . . it is hard to fathom how the
government's position (in defending an unreasonable action) would be reasonable." Id. at
1583. But see Edson v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9182 (N.D. Ala. 1984)
(such distinction is required).
60. See Penner v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1582, 1583-84 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
61. See id. at 1584 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 686,
reprintedat 1982 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1449). Interestingly, the district court
reduced the attorney fees requested by the taxpayer's counselor, limiting the maximum hourly
rate to $90.00 per atttorney hour, even though the statute does not require such a limitation.
See id. at 1584.
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A district court in Hallam v. Murphy 62 levied attorney fees against
the government in a case in which the IRS had abated an assessment
for lack of issuing the required notice to the taxpayers. The abatement occurred after the taxpayers filed suit to enjoin collection.6 3 The
government used the familiar arguments that the taxpayer had not
exhausted all administrative remedies and that the government's position was reasonable. The government's contention that administrative remedies had not been exhausted was based on a letter sent to the
taxpayers which directed the taxpayers to pay the tax and file for a
refund. The IRS claimed that the taxpayer's failure to comply with
the letter precluded an award of attorney fees. 6" In rejecting the government's argument, the court found that paying alleged tax deficiencies and filing a claim for refund were not within the definition of
administrative remedies contemplated by section 7430(b)(2). 65
As to the unreasonableness issue, the Hallam court concluded that
the government behavior during the entire tax proceedings should be
examined, not just the behavior after litigation had commenced.6 6
The court also found that the government's continued assertion of its
position against the Hallams was per se unreasonable, therefore, the
award of attorney fees and costs were justified under section 7430.67
Sharpe v. United States,68 demonstrates the availability of attorney
fees in an estate tax litigation situation. In Sharpe, the IRS claimed
that the estate was liable for tax on the value of property in a trust
over which the decedent had allegedly been a co-trustee under the
62. 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9230 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
63. See id. 9230. On June 6, 1983, the Hallams filed suit seeking to permanently enjoin

the government from collecting alleged tax deficiencies for the tax year 1977. The Hallams
alleged that the government was not entitled to collect the alleged tax deficiency because the
required notice was not issued. After the Hallam suit was filed, the government abated the tax
assessment. Therefore, the only material issue before the court concerned the Hallam's motion
for an award of attorney fees and costs. See id. $ 9230.
64. See id. 9230. The government claimed that "if the refund procedure is an adequate
legal remedy prohibiting injunctive relief, it is entitled to recognition as an adequate administrative remedy under 26 U.S.C. § 7430." IM 9230. The court held, however, that "an adequate remedy at law is a different question than whether the plaintiffs exhausted all available
administrative remedies." Id. T9230.
65. See id. 9230.
66. See id. 9230. The Hallam court stated that the government knew, or should have
known, that the Hallams never received the required notification. The court concluded, therefore, that the government's continued assertion of a known incorrect position was unreasonable per se. See id. 9230.
67. See id. I 9230.
68. 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 13,574 (E.D. Va. 1984).
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provisions of sections 204169 and 2035 of the Internal Revenue
Code.7 ° Both the will and trust instrument provided that whenever
the trustees were empowered to invade the corpus or allocate income
for the benefit of the decedent, the decedent was disqualified from
acting as a trustee in such situations. The government ultimately conceded the case after briefs were exchanged, but before the actual trial.
The government's only viable argument against the award of attorney fees in Sharpe was that its actions were reasonable. In holding for
the taxpayer, the court provided two reasons for holding that the government's actions were unreasonable. First, the district court undertook a review of the statutory and case law in the general power of
appointment area and found no support for the government's position.71 Second, the court found that the IRS recommendation to the
Department of Justice that an administrative refund for the full tax
and interest claimed by the estate should be made, was a factor to be
considered. 72 Again, attorney fees and costs for the litigation were
awarded under section 7430.
A third party not directly involved as a taxpayer in tax litigation
has also been awarded attorney fees under section 7430. In Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Tranakos, 73 a securities firm was holding
assets for a taxpayer in the taxpayer's capacity as a trustee. The IRS
levied on accounts held by Prudential-Bache relating to the potential
personal tax liability of the trustee-taxpayer. Both the taxpayer and
the IRS demanded that Prudential-Bache distribute the assets to
them. The securities firm brought an interpleader action to have the
district court decide the legal owner of the funds. The government
ultimately released its levies after determining that the taxpayer had
no personal interest in the assets. The court found that the securities
firm was indeed a "prevailing party" in the tax-related interpleader
action. 4 In the court's opinion, the attempt by the IRS to enforce its
69. See id. 13,574. The IRS characterized the co-trusteeship as a general power of
appointment. The Sharpe court, however, held that the government's position that a general
power of appointment should be imputed to the plaintiff was unreasonable. See id 113,574.
70. See id 13,574. The decedent had resigned from his co-trusteeship, however, it was
within three years of his death. Therefore, under section 2035, the trust assets are includable
as part of his taxable estate. See id. 13,574.
71. See id. 113,574.
72. See id. 113,574.
73. 593 F. Supp. 783 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
74. See id. at 787. The court held that Prudential-Bache qualified as a prevailing party
because (1) it established that the position of the United States in the interpleader action was
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levies once it had knowledge that the taxpayer held the subject assets
in a fiduciary capacity was unreasonable behavior. 7 The court therefore awarded attorney fees and costs to Prudential-Bache under section 7430.
C.

Tax Court Decisions

Because of the limited success enjoyed by taxpayers in the United
States District Courts and Circuit Courts, one might also expect taxpayers would enjoy limited success in the Tax Court. However, from
the effectiveness date of section 7430 through the date of writing of
this article (well over two years), attorney fees have not been awarded
to a taxpayer in a reported Tax Court decision under the provisions of
section 7430.76 The primary reason for this situation is a very restrictive interpretation of the statute by the full Tax Court in the case of
Baker v. Commissioner.77 Since Baker, subsequent taxpayer attempts
for an award of attorney fees in the Tax Court have been dismissed by
memorandum decisions. 78 Even though the taxpayer did not prevail
in the Baker case, this case must be analyzed to evaluate the possibility of collecting attorney fees from the government in cases tried
before the Tax Court.
The facts in Baker are straightforward. The IRS assessed deficiencies against the taxpayer based on four grounds: additional income
from (1) disallowance of a foreign earned income exclusion; (2) for
rental value of housing provided the taxpayer by his employer; (3)
additional deductions from an increase in rental loss; and (4) allowunreasonable based on the clear impropriety of the levy notices issued, and (2) it substantially
prevailed on the most significant issue in the interpleader action by avoiding multiple liability.
See id. at 787.
75. See id. at 786. The court found that the United States did not make an effort to verify
or controvert the taxpayer's claim that the assets were held in a fiduciary capacity. Although
the levies were eventually released, the court found that the IRS "did not review the relevant
documents within a reasonable time after... objections to the notices were presented to it."
Id. at 787 n.4.
76. Cf BNA DAILY TAx REPORT No. 81, April 26, 1985 Tax Court Judge Howard
Dawson reported to the House Ways and Means Select Revenue Measures Subcommittee that
the government had agreed to ten to fifteen out of court settlements for attorney fees in Tax
Court cases with settlement amounts ranging between $500 and $1000. See idL at 81.
77. 83 T.C. 822 (1984).
78. See Apirtis v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (P-H) 85,044 (T.C. 1985) (relies on Baker as basis
for denial of award of attorney fees); Popham v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (P-H) 84,652 (T.C. 1984)
(Baker cited in denying award).
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ance of a deduction for excess foreign living costs.7 9 Several administrative hearings and litigation meetings later, the government
conceded to the taxpayer on all issues. The taxpayer then brought an
action to collect attorney fees from the government under section
7430.80
The taxpayer's claim was based on alleged unreasonable government behavior in promulgating the disputed income tax regulation
and in determining the deficiencies."' Since this claim was based on
pre-litigation behavior, the Tax Court first addressed the issue of
whether pre-litigation behavior could be considered in determining a

potential
"unreasonable"
classification
under
section
7430(c)(2)(A)(i). 82 The Tax Court concluded that pre-litigation behavior could not be considered. 83 The court decided that Congress
had intended to distinguish administrative proceedings from litigation. 84 This distinction was evidenced by the requirement of exhausting administrative remedies as a prerequisite to an award, and of
restricting collectible attorney fees to those incurred in litigation.8"

The court therefore considered only post-litigation behavior in ad86
dressing the award of attorney fees.

The Tax Court's rejection of the government's pre-litigation behavior is the most significant reason for the unfavorable environment for
79. See Baker v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 822, 824 (1984).
80. See id. at 824. The specifics of a motion for litigation costs in the Tax Court are
contained in Rules 230-233 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. See TAX Cr.
R. PRACTICE 230-233.
81. See Baker v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 822, 826 (1984). In Baker, one controversy concerned
whether the taxpayer resided in "a camp", as defined by the regulations, to become eligible for
the foreign earned income exclusion. See id. at 829; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.911-1(c)(l)(iv)
(1985).
82. See Baker v. Comm'r, 83 T. C. 822, 826 (1984).
83. See id. at 826-27.
84. See id. at 826.
85. See id. at 827; see also I.R.C. § 7430(b)(2) (Supp. 1985) (before fees awarded in subsequent civil proceeding, all administrative remedies must first be exhausted). The court relied
on the legislative history of section 7430(b)(2) as support for its conclusion. See Baker v.
Comm'r, 83 T.C. 822, 827 (1984). The legislative history stated:
Recoverable litigation costs include only the reasonable amount of costs which are incurred in the litigation of a civil tax action or proceeding. The committee intends that the
costs ofpreparingandfiling thepetition or complaint which commences a civil tax action be
the first of any recoverable attorney'sfeet Fees paid or incurred for the services of an
attorney during the administrative stages of the case could not be recovered under an
award of litigation costs. [Emphasis added.]
Id at 827 (citing H.R. REP. No. 404, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)).
86. See Baker v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 822, 827 (1984).
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an award of attorney fees in Tax Court litigation. As discussed earlier, other federal courts which awarded the taxpayer attorney fees
noted that the government's unreasonable position usually began with
pre-litigation behavior and was a decisive factor in the final "unreasonable" determination required by section 7430.17 As concluded in
Kaufman, deciding this issue in the government's favor severely restricts the availability of recovery for taxpayers."' While the Tax
Court presently maintains a pro-government position on the issue of
pre-litigation behavior, it can be hoped that it will follow the Kaufman analysis in the near future - as it is obligated to do. 9
While avoiding the issue of pre-litigation behavior, the Tax Court
in Baker does set some standards for determining the reasonableness
of the government's position in the post-litigation period. The opinion provides that an unreasonableness determination should be based
on an analysis of all the facts and circumstances of the case after litigation has begun. 90 Also, the fact that the government loses the case
is not determinative.91 The court noted that the underlying controversy was one of first impression and was a factor favoring the government's actions. 92 Moreover, the Tax Court believed the government's
timely and thorough investigation of the case should be considered.93
It appears, therefore, that excessive delays or lack of effort to obtain
dispositive evidence on the part
of the government could be classified
94
position.
unreasonable
as an
87. See Kaufman v. Egger, 584 F. Supp. 872, 877-78 (D. Me. 1984) (government's wrongful conduct included pre-litigation conduct), affid, 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Penner
v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1582, 1583 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (government's initiation ofjeopardy
assessment considered unreasonable position); Sharpe v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 13,574 (E.D. Va. 1984) (recovery of attorney's fees allowed for both administrative
and judicial level when government's position unreasonable); Hallam v. Murphy, 84-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 9230 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (prior time frame to consider government's unreasonableness is throughout entire tax proceeding).
88. See Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1985).
89. See Golsen v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1982) (judicial administration mandates
Tax Court to follow decisions of court of appeals).
90. See Baker v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 822, 829 (1984).
91. See id. at 828-29.
92. See id at 829. It appears that the Tax Court would view a government position that
is contrary to a significant published decision as unreasonable. Cf id at 829.
93. See id at 829.
94. Cf. id. at 830. The district court in Prudential-Bache Securities held that delays in
reviewing relevant documents within a reasonable time was unreasonable under section 7430.
See Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Tranakos, 593 F. Supp. 783, 787 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
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United States Claims Court Decision

One recent United States Claims Court decision deals with the section 7430 issue. In Columbus Fruit and Vegetable Coop. v. United
States,95 the IRS challenged a taxpayer deduction for patronage dividends. When the taxpayer requested a statutory notice of deficiency,
the IRS issued that notice without first issuing a preliminary notice of
disallowance as required by IRS procedure. 96 The IRS tried to argue
that the taxpayer had not exhausted the administrative remedies as
required by section 7430(b)(2) because the taxpayer neither filed a
written protest or requested an appeals conference. However, the
court disagreed because Treasury regulation 301.7430(f)(3)(ii) provides that the taxpayer need not exhaust administrative remedies if
the IRS does not issue a preliminary notice of disallowance. 97
On the issue of whether the government's position in the litigation
was unreasonable, the court analyzed the statutory and case law underlying the patronage dividend deduction. 9 The court found that
the government's litigation position was unreasonable in light of congressional intent to promote the business venture and methods of the
plaintiff.9 9 While recognizing that the issue of whether pre-litigation
behavior could be considered in an "unreasonableness" determination
was important, the United States Claims Court did not address the
issue because it believed the government's litigation behavior justified
an award of attorney fees to the taxpayer."0°
III.

THE FUTURE

Built into section 7430 was a sunset provision which terminates the
availability of awards for attorney fees for actions commenced after
December 31, 1985.101 Even in the event that the coverage of this
95. 85-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9518 (Cl. Ct. 1985).
96. See id. 9518.
97. See id. 9518 (citing Treas. Reg. § 7430-1(1985))
98. See id. 9518.
99. See id. 9518.
100. See id. 9518. The Court of Claims however did state, in dicta, that a taxpayer
should recover only those costs incurred during litigation and not those costs arising from IRS
administrative procedures. See id. 9518; see also Zielinski v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9514 (D. Minn. 1984). The court also limited the taxpayer's attorney to a
$75.00 hourly rate. See Columbus Fruit and Vegetable Coop. v. U.S., 85-2 U.S. Tax. Cas.
(CCH) 9518 (Cl. Ct. 1985).
101. See I.R.C. § 7430(0. The sunset provision of section 7430 states in the pertinent
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statute is not extended by Congress, the impact of the provisions of
section 7430 will extend for several years until all tax litigation commenced prior to 1986 is finally concluded. Preliminary hearings by
the House Ways and Means Select Revenue Measures Subcommittee
indicate no opposition to the extension of section 7430 from any of the
witnesses, which included, Tax Court judges, the IRS Commissioner,
and the assistant attorney general for the tax division of the Department of Justice.10 2 There was some disagreement, however, among
the witnesses as to potential modifications in the statutory language,
especially on the issues of pre-litigation behavior and burden of
proof.103.
In any extended version of section 7430, two matters must be addressed. First, due to the significant split in opinion demonstrated by
the previous case analysis, Congress needs to address the issue of
whether pre-litigation government behavior can be considered by the
court in determining whether the government's position was unreasonable. It is the author's considered opinion that pre-litigation behavior should be considered by all courts in determining the
unreasonableness of the government's position. As demonstrated in
the Baker case, a provision eliminating pre-litigation behavior from
consideration would severely restrict the availability of the remedy to
taxpayers. Such a severe restriction is contrary to the purposes of
providing the remedy. The second matter to be addressed must be
funding for the awards. Due to an oversight in the original legislation, no revenue has been appropriated to fund the awards."i°
IV.

CONCLUSION

While section 7430 does provide for the possibility of collecting attorney fees from the government, the standards imposed by the statute and the judiciary make the likelihood of such an award far from
certain, even if the taxpayer prevails in the litigation. A recovery is
especially difficult in the Tax Court since the court does not consider
the government's pre-litigation behavior as an element of the reasonapart: "[t]his section shall not apply to any proceeding commenced after December 31, 1985."
Id § 7430(f).
102. See BNA DAILY TAx REPORT No. 81 at 2, April 26, 1985.
103. See id at 2-3.
104. See id at 2. House Ways and Means Select Revenue Measures Subcommittee chairman Charles Rangel of New York noted the need for revenue provisions and "promised this
matter would be addressed in any extension." Id at 2.
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bleness of the government's position. Other federal courts, however,
have made the availability of attorney fees more likely by properly
considering both pre- and post-litigation government behavior. Tax
practitioners should also expect section 7430's provisions to have a
continuing impact, despite the section's sunset provision, since a consensus of government representatives, tax professionals, and academicians has agreed that this type of remedy is useful in compensating the
few taxpayers who have suffered as a result of unreasonable government behavior. Tax professionals should therefore always keep the
availability of this remedy in mind during all stages of confrontation
with the government so that an adequate record is preserved in appropriate cases.
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